Former president calls for specialized training and modern technology to end decade-long crisis
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo has expressed profound concern that the Boko Haram insurgency has now persisted for 15 years, surpassing the duration of the Nigerian Civil War.
The former Head of State, who played a significant role in ending the Civil War, noted the conflict ended after just 30 months, highlighting the alarming persistence of the current security crisis. Obasanjo’s comparison underscores the unprecedented nature of Nigeria’s ongoing struggle with asymmetric warfare.
The elder statesman warned that Nigeria’s continuous struggle with insurgency and banditry will not end unless the military undertakes crucial reforms. He specifically called for specialized foreign training to adapt to the new security realities facing the nation. Obasanjo’s remarks were made during a virtual appearance on the Toyin Falola Interviews, which also featured other high-profile Nigerian thinkers.
Security forces trained for conventional warfare only
Speaking at the interview, Obasanjo argued that Nigeria’s security forces are primarily trained for “conventional warfare” and static enemies. He explained that this type of military engagement involves planning, deployment, and dealing with fixed targets. The former President asserted that this training is critically inadequate for addressing the current asymmetric, guerrilla-style conflicts confronting the country.
He noted that fighting “fleeting targets” or enemies “living among your people” requires an entirely different set of operational skills and intelligence gathering capabilities. Obasanjo cited Colombia as one of the few countries that have successfully handled this type of specialized warfare. He suggested there would be “no shame” in inviting them to train Nigerian forces in these critical counter-insurgency tactics.
Four critical items needed to overcome the insurgency
The former President identified four critical components that must be addressed by Nigeria’s military, executive, and legislative arms to overcome the decade-long insurgency. The first key item is specialized training tailored for unconventional warfare, moving away from outdated conventional doctrines. This training must reflect the reality of fighting highly mobile, non-state actors.
The second vital component is equipment, noting that the arms and ammunition required to effectively combat this type of warfare are inherently different from those used in conventional conflicts. The third critical element is absolute intelligence, emphasizing the need for reliable information gathering. Finally, the fourth item is technology, which must be deployed effectively alongside the other three pillars.
Obasanjo recalls failed attempt at Boko Haram negotiations
Obasanjo took the opportunity to recall his personal attempt in 2011 to understand the origins, grievances, and leadership structure of the Boko Haram sect in Maiduguri. He recounted that he informed the then-President of his intention but declined the offer of a government plane. He felt that traveling on a government aircraft would immediately brand him as a “government agent” and erode any trust he might build with the insurgents.
Upon arriving, he discovered that the insurgents were an “organized group” and that their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was highly regarded even by other clergy members. He initially managed to convince the group to consider engaging in talks with the federal government. However, the insurgents later insisted that any negotiations could not happen anywhere in Africa, an impossible condition for the former President.
Government failed to follow up on proposed peace talks
After his initial contact, Obasanjo reported everything he had learned to the government, but he lamented that “nothing was done.” When the insurgents later sought a timeframe for when talks would commence, Obasanjo appealed to them to “cease fire for 21 days” while the government worked out the modalities for contact. Regrettably, he stepped out of the process, and the government “never made contact with them.”
The former president also criticized the process by which the military procures its equipment, stating that asking the military to be the one buying equipment “is not done.” He asserted that the entire procurement process should be viewed as an “industry,” implying the need for specialized, external oversight and management. His commentary serves as a stark warning about the need for institutional reform to defeat the protracted security crisis.
